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AVIATION

WILLIAM D. BUTrREY*
Attorney-Advisor
Office of the General Counsel
U.. Civil Aeronautics Board

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
FAIR COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ACT OF 1974
On January 3, 197-5 the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974 was signed into. law (P.L. 93-623). The
enactment recognized the fact that United States air carriers operating in
foreign air transportation perform services of vital importance to the
foreign commerce of the United States (including its balance of payments),
to the Postal Service, and to the national defense, and that such carriers
have in some instances become subject to a variety of discriminatory
and unfair cominpetitive practices in their competition with certain foreign
air carriers. Therefore, the new legislation provides, among other things,
additional measures that may be utilized to eliminate discriminatory practices and excessive user charges in international air transportation and
places additional responsibilities upon the Civil Aeronautics Board and
other departments of the Government. Set forth below is a brief summary
of the provisions of the Act.
Discriminatoryand Unfair CompetitivePractices
This section directs the Departments of State, Treasury, and Transportation, and the Civil.Aeronautics Board, and other departments and
agencies, to monitor all forms of discrimination or unfair competitive
*Member of the Florida Bar and a candidate for a Master of Law in International Law at the University of Miami. The statements and opinions contained
in this article are Mr. Buttrey's own and do not necessarily represent the opinions
and/or conclusions of the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Office of the General
Counsel.
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practices in foreign air transportation and to take appropriate action to
eliminate such discriminatory practices. These departments and agencies
are to request additional legislation as may be necessary to provide legal
authority adequate to deal with such discriminatory or unfair practices.
In addition, the Board is directed to report annually to the Congress concerning the specific actions taken to eliminate discrimination and unfair
practices, and its continuing program for such elimination. The Secretaries
of State, Transportation, and Treasury are directed to transmit to the
Board data to facilitate the preparation of such a report.
InternationalUser Charges
This section directs the Secretary of Transportation to survey the
airport and airway charges imposed upon U.S. air carriers and foreign
entities in foreign air transportation and to determine whether these
charges unreasonably exceed comparable charges for furnishing such
service in the U.S. or are otherwise discriminatory. If found discriminatory, the Secretary is directed to promptly report such cases to the Secretary of State and the Civil Aeronautics Board who are directed to promptly
initiate negotiations with the foreign country involved for the purpose of
reducing or eliminating excessive charges or discrimination. If negotiations
should prove unfruitful, the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to exact
compensating charges equal to such excessive or discriminatory charges
from the flag carriers of the country involved. The amounts so collected
are to be deposited in a fund for the purpose of compensating U.S. carriers
for excessive or discriminatory charges paid by them to the foreign country
involved.
Mail Rates
This section directs the Secretary of State and the Postmaster General
to oppose any mail rates higher than "fair and reasonable" for the carriage
of mail in foreign air transportation. The Board is directed to act expeditiously on proposed changes in international mail rates, and in estallishing
such rates the Board is directed to employ these criteria: (a) current
Universal Postal Union (U.P.U.) rates; (b) ratemaking elements considered by the U.P.U.; and (c) any competitive disadvantages to U.S.
carriers resulting from foreign air carriers receipt of U.P.U. rates for
the carriage of U.S. mail and their own national origin mail.
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Government.FinanedPassengersand Property
This section requires that the air transportation of persons and property paid for by U.S. funds shall be on U.S. flag carriers to the extent that
service by such carriers is available, and that air transportation on a
foreign flag carrier will not be paid for by U.S. funds in the absence of
satisfactory proof of the necessity therefor.
Promotionol Travel on U.S. Carriers
This section requires encouragement to the maximum extent feasible
of travel to and from the United States on U.S. flag carriers.
Observance of Tarijfs by Ticket Agents
This section requires adherence to published tariffs and forbids
domestic or foreign air carriers and ticket agents from refunding or re.
mitting any part of the rates, fares, and charges so specified. It further
provides that the Board shall have access to all lands, buildings, equipment,
accounts, records, and memoranda of domestic and foreign air carriers
and ticket agents, including all documents, papers, and correspondence of
such entities.
ProhibitionAgainst Rebates
This section requires adherence to published tariffs for air trans.
portation of property by shippers and forbids them to solicit or accept
a refund, remittance, or special favor not specified in the tariffs. It
further fixes a fine of not less than $100 nor more than 8500 for each
offense constituting a solicitation or acceptance of a refund or remittance
from the published tariffs for the air transportation of property.
INSPITITIONAL CONTROL INVESTIGATION
The Civil Aeronautics Board has divided its Institutional Control oJ
Air Carriers Investigation into two phases, has added 116 new parties,
and dismissed four of the original parties. The Board has also denied
petitions for reconsideration of the order instituting the case. The general
purpose of the inquiry is to determine: (1) whether, and in what manner,
equity holding financial institutions, aircraft lessors, and substantial credi.
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tors may influence the managements of airlines, and in light thereof,
whether any such persons, individually or jointly, control any airline
within the meaning of Sec. 408(a)(5) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958; (2) whether further adjudicatory action should be taken with regard
to any control or interlocking relationships found to exist within the scope
of 49 U.S.C. 1378 and 1379; (3) whether amendments to the Board's
regulations are warranted by reason of the above matter; and (4) whether
the Board should propose changes in the Federal Aviation Act or other
statutory provisions of law.
In taking this action, the Board stated that it recognized that the
case would be lengthy and complex, but that such fact was not a valid
reason to avoid the investigation of matters of such potential importance
to the regulation of the air transportation system as those which the case
encompasses. The Board noted that allegations of control of air carriers
by financial institutions raise issues that warrant a full and thorough
investigation of the situation.
The Board added that it need not establish that a control relationship
in fact exists before instituting an investigation to determine whether
such control does or does not exist under the Board's discretionary right
to investigate. Nor would it be necessary to establish the existence of
"control" under the law to conclude that a financial institution has actually
exercised control of an airline. Control, the Board said, "implies the
existence of a right or power in the controlling party to direct or dominate
the affairs of a company whether actually exercised or existing only in
potential use." The Board observed that control "involves the act or the
power of direction or domination under many and varied circumstances,
and the controlling person need not direct or dominate all of the affairs
of the controlled corporation."
The Board concluded that dividing the case into two phases, each
with a separate decision, could best facilitate its progress without compromising on the development of a full and complete record "which would
be essential to a careful consideration and definitive resolution of the
issues presented." The Board stated that the two phases would be tried
serially.
PHASE I
This phase of the proceeding will develop the facts needed to identify
on a current, prospective, and historical basis, each of the relationships,
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direct and indirect, existing among the certificate carriers and financial
institutions (including the parents and affiliates of either.) It will also
develop information necessary to understand the nature and extent of the
relationships identified; the underlying carrier and industry conditions
giving rise to such relationships, and other information which the administrative law judge shall deem necessary to selection of the relationships
which Phase II will examine definitively. Phase I will also consider
whether amendments or additions to current Board reporting requirements
should be adopted and whether additional legislation is needed to authorize
the Board to obtain any further reports which should be required.
PHASE 11
This phase of the proceeding will decide the remaining issues specified in the original order instituting the case, including whether and in
what manner financial institutions may influence the managements of
airlines; whether any such persons (individually or jointly) may or do
control any carrier within the meaning of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958; whether and what further adjudicatory action should be taken with
regard to any control or interlocking relationships found to exist, or which
the evidence indicates are likely to exist under the Act; and what further
amendments or changes, if any, to Board regulations, the Federal Aviation
Act, or other statutory provisions are warranted by reason of such findings.
SAFETY
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released a
preliminary report on U.S. civil aviation safety statistics indicating that
1974 was the worst year for fatalities in commercial aviation since 1960.
Comparing 1974 air carrier operations with the previous year, the NTSB
stated that the total number of accidents increased, the number of fatal
accidents remained the same, but the number of fatalities more than
doubled. With respect to general aviation, such comparison indicates that
while the total number of -accidents increased, the number of fatal accidents and the number of fatalities both decreased.
Air CarrierOperations
U.S. air carriers in 1974 had forty-seven total accidents compared to
forty-three in 1973 with fatal accidents remaining constant at nine in both
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years. However, fatalities increased from 227 in 1973 to 467 in 1974,
representing the largest number of fatal injuries in a single year since
1960 when 499 fatalities occurred. Ratewise, in air carrier operations,
with flight hours down in 1974 compared to 1973, the "total accident
rate" per 100,000 aircraft-hours flown increased from 0.661 in 1973 to
0.779 in 1974 and the "fatal accident rate" increased from 0.138 during
1973 to 0.149 in 1974.
Three of the nine air carrier accidents occurred outside the United
States: in Pago Pago, American Samoa; Island of Bali, Republic of
Indonesia; and in the Ionian Sea near Athens, Greece. Five of the nine
fatal accidents accounted for 454 of the 467 fatalities. These five accidents
were the three mentioned above plus two in domestic operations: one at
Charlotte, North Carolina and the other at Berryville, Virginia. The NTSB
pointed out, however, that one of the nine fatal accidents recorded in 1974,
while necessary to report, did not involve any aeronautic failure but
occurred when an infant passenger was strangled by a seat belt.
During the eleven-year period 1964-74, the total number of accidents
in all operations in U.S. air carrier aviation had a generally decreasing
trend with a high of eighty-three accidents in 1965 to a low of forty-three
accidents in 1973. The report shows that the same is true in terms of
accident rates- starting with a high of 1.809 accidents per 100,000
aircraft-hours flown in 1964 decreasing to a low of 0.661 per aircraft-hours
flown in 1973. The NTSB observed that the number of fatal accidents
from year to year has shown relatively slight deviation with a high of
fifteen in 1968 and a low of eight in 1966, 1970, 1971, and 1972 and
nine each for the past two years. The fatal accident rate generally had a
decreasing trend from 1964 to 1971, with a high of 0.278 per 100,000
aircraft-hours flown during 1964 to a low of 0.094 in 1971. However,
the report indicates that the fatal accident rate had increased each year
for the past three years to 0.127, 0.138, and 0.149 in 1972, 1973, and
1974, respectively.
In scheduled passenger service only, the certificated airlines carried
202.2 million passengers in 1973 and 204.6 million in 1974. However,
the estimated passenger miles flown decreased from 171.4 billion in 1973
to 163.9 billion in 1974. Total accidents increased from thirty-two in
1973 to foity-bne in 1974; at the same time, fatal accidents increased.
from six to seven, and passenger fatalities more than doubled: 197 in
1973 to 420 in 1974. With the increase in passenger fatalities and decrease
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in passenger miles flown, the corresponding passenger fatality rate per 100
million passenger miles flown increased from 0.115 in 1973 to 0.256 in
1974, which is the highest rate since 1965.
GeneralAviation Operations
The report states that in U.S. general aviation in. 1974, there were
4,362 total accidents compared to 4,251 in 1973, the first such increase
since 1967. At the same time, however, fatal accidents decreased from 722
in 1973 to 653 in 1974, the lowest number since 1970. Fatalities decreased
from 1,411 in 1973 to 1,290 in 1974, the lowest since 1966. Ratewise, with
a slight increase over 1973 hours flown, general aviation figures for 1974
show the "total accident rate" per 100,000 aircraft-hours flown decreased
from 14.1 in 1973 to 14.0 in 1974. At the same time, however, the "fatal
accident rate" per 100,000 aircraft-hours flown in general aviation dropped
from 2.40 in 1973 to 2.09 in 1974. It was noted that both the total and
fatal accident rates in general aviation are the lowest recorded as far back
as 1946.
The NTSB report indicates that in general aviation since 1968, the
total number of accidents had a decreasing trend, with a high of 4,968
accidents in 1968 and a low of 4,251 in 1973. Likewise, the accident rate
per 100,000 aircraft-hours flown had a decreasing trend, starting at
20.6 in 1968 and decreasing to a low of 14.0 in 1974. The number of
fatal accidents since 1968 has fluctuated up and down starting with 692
in 1968, decreasing to a low of 641 in 1970, increasing to a high of 722
in 1973, and decreasing again to 653 in 1974. Similarly, the fatal accident
rates have fluctuated starting with 2.86 per 100,000 aircraft-hours flown
in 1968 and dropping to 2.09 per 100,000 aircraft-hours flown in 1974.
The report indicates that the ratio of fatal accidents to total accidents
increased during the period 1970 through 1973, but that the trend was
reversed in 1974 when total accidents increased and fatal accidents
decreased.
EMERGENCY EVACUATION
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has completed a
special study of air carrier accidents involving emergency evacuation and
has determined that serious problems exist which merit further safety
studies and corrective actions. The study included case histories of ten
accidents and has resulted in the NTSB's recommending a number of
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measures to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) intended to
alleviate the problems that were detected in the study. Although the study
did not include means of preventing or retarding post-crash fire, it
recognized the necessity of rapid evacuation in such accidents. In this
connection, the NTSB reiterated its 1973 recommendation that would
require brighter emergency cabin lighting to facilitate passenger guidance
to emergency exits.
The special emergency evacuation study made findings in five categories as set forth below:
Evacuation Slides - It was found that slide failures are not reported,
thus their reliability cannot be exactly determined. Past accident experience
indicates, however, that failures occur frequently limiting exit usability.
Many older airliners have slides which deploy automatically but must be
inflated manually (a time-consuming process), while fully automatic slides
provide a usable exit almost immediately. Slides on wide-body airliners
can become near vertical when the aircraft is nose or tail-high; use of
such slides caused eight serious and nineteen minor injuries in one case.
Exterior Emergency Lighting - The study was found that existing
systems activate only when main aircraft power is interrupted. Therefore,
because normal power may continue, leaving emergency lights out or
requiring a switch to emergency power, a more reliable system should
be employed that would be activated by door opening in the emergency
mode.
Emergency Communications- It was determined that currently required portable megaphones are stowed in rather inconspicuous and
inaccessible locations in the passenger cabins and were not used in any
of the ten accident cases studied. Many are large, heavy, and cumbersome
to handle in a crowded cabin. Pubic address systems often are used when
they remain operable. Whatever is used, a concise evacuation order is
essential, and reliable communication during the evacuation is important.
Passenger Safety Information- It was found that evacuated passengers often say they needed more advance information, yet cannot recall
the pre-takeoff briefing and had not read the safety information card.
Study of one of the ten cases suggests that passengers who were not
attentive to safety information were much more susceptible to being
injured during an evacuation. Although the NTSB in 1972 urged both
government and industry to improve passenger safety information, there
still exists a need for upgraded and standardized requirements.
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Crewmember Emergency Training- It was found that crew performance has a great potential for causing problems during evacuations,
and several of the ten cases suggest that current crewmember emergency
training may be inadequate. Some airlines rely more on audio-visual
demonstrations than on actual hands-on training. More realistic initial and
continuous training would significantly increase survival and reduce
injuries.
As a result of the NTSB's study of emergency evacuation of commercial airliners, the agency recommended that FAA take the following
actions:
(1) Require air carriers to report to it all emergency evacuation
slide deployments, failures, and malfunctions;
(2) Develop a maintenace surveillance program to insure greater
reliability of emergency evacuation slide systems;
(3) Require that slides be long enough to reach the ground at a safe
angle in a landing gear collapse, and set a reasonable deadline for installation of such new slides;
(4) Require, after a' reasonable date, that slides on all floor-level
exits inflate automatically on deployment;
(5) Require, after a reasonable date, that exterior emergency lighting activate automatically on emergency opening of exits;
(6) Require air carriers to assign flight attendant responsibility for
megaphone use during evacuation, and relocate such equipment within
easy reach of the assigned attendant's seat. Consideration should be given
to installation of new, compact, lightweight megaphones;
(7) Require, after a reasonable date, that public address systems be
capable of operating on a power source independent of the main aircraft
power supply;
(8) Require that passengers be warned during pre-takeoff briefing
how important it is that they understand how to use emergency exits;
(9) Issue an advisory circular giving the airline industry standardized guidance on effective presentation of safety information to passengers;
and
(10) Eliminate an existing regulatory provision permitting air
carriers to use only demonstrations to train crewmembers for certain
emergencies, thus requiring drills in operation and use of emergency
exits.
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PAN AM-TWA AGREEMENT
The Civil Aeronautics Board has unanimously approved an agreement
between Pan American World Airways and Trans World Airlines thereby
authorizing various mutual suspensions on their Pacific and transatlantic
route systems. In addition, each carrier will receive certain new authority
by temporary exemptions from certain provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act that would otherwise prohibit proposed operations. The approval is
effective for a period of two years or until ninety days after the final
Board decision in the Transatlantic Route Proceeding, whichever occurs
first.
The carriers originally filed their route transfer and suspension agreement late last year requesting expeditious processing by the Board. However, the Board ruled that the filing did not permit positive Board action
of any kind and urged the parties to file for suspension and route modification authority that could be considered through the use of the Board's
nonhearing procedures. The parties' second agreement received the Board's
expeditious approval.
In approving the agreement, the Board observed that the financial
deterioration of the two carriers, brought on at least in part by traffic
and cost conditions beyond their control, demanded immediate regulatory
action, and, that under the circustances presented, the Board's extraordinary exemption powers should be employed. In this regard, the Board
estimated that the agreement would produce net operating gains of between
$17 million and $24.2 million for Pan Am and between $16 million and
$25.4 million for TWA in the first year of its effectiveness. These forecasts are in stark contrast to the combined system losses of over $111
million for the year ended September 30, 1974.
Although Pan Am's primary benefits will come in the Pacific where
TWA's duplicative service will be eliminated, Pan Am will also benefit
greatly from the additional revenues resulting from the Board's grant of
exemption authority to serve Taipei and Okinawa. The Board recognized
that while implementation of the agreement would have a net adverse
impact upon Pan Am's Atlantic Division, the European suspensions were
an important part of the entire agreement. TWA's greatest improvements
will be in Europe where Pan Am's service at Paris and between Los Angeles and London will be eliminated. Also expected to benefit TWA is the
Board's grant of exemption authority allowing TWA service in the U.S.
Iberian markets where Pan Am's service was suspended. The Board noted
that while TWA's temporary suspension at Frankfurt, Germany and in the
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Pacific will, by that carrier's estimate, result in a net decrease in revenues
for TWA in 1975, the adverse impact would be more than outweighed by
improvements made possible by other provisions of the agreement.
Stressing the view that it considered the agreement as only the first
of many self-help programs that it expects the two carriers to devise to
improve their financial positions, the Board indicated that the two airlines
should immediately consider other cost-saving programs such as unilateral
suspension of unprofitable routes, reduction of overall levels of operations,
reductions in operating expenses through austerity measures, reduction of
capital expenditures, the sale of aircraft and other assets, and other route
restructuring proposals. The Board also cautioned the carriers against
trying to redistribute aircraft capacity, which the agreement will release,
into other areas which already receive substantial U.S.-flag capacity such
as the charter market.
Answering Department of Justice arguments in opposition to the
agreement, the Board stated that the gravity of the financial situation
confronting Pan American and TWA (the two largest U.S. international
competitors) required that immediate emergency route-related action be
taken to provide short-term economic relief to avoid substantial disruption
of their international services. In this connection, the Board noted that
such a disruption could foreshadow the virtual termination of all U.S.-flag
competition in the affected international markets, but that the benefits
which Pan Am and TWA would reap from the Board's action should, in
the long run, preserve U.S.-flag competition.
Although the Board imposed no labor protective provisions on the
agreement, it directed the applicants and interested labor parties to file
further pleadings giving detailed estimates of the impact of the agreement,
by station, on each class of employees of each carrier, and the financial
impact on the applicants which might result from the imposition of
standard labor protective provisions. The Board also instructed the parties
to address the possibility of tailoring the standard labor protective provisions normally imposed in merger cases to fit the scope of the subject
agreement, including the possible use of labor protective guidelines.
FUEL MATTERS
Fuel Relotzed FareIncreases
The Civil Aeronautics Board has approved International Air Trans.
port Association (IATA) agreements providing for fuel-related fare in-
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creases of four to eight percent in U.S.-Caribbean and U.S.-Central/South
America markets and has disapproved proposed increases in U.S. west
coast-Mexico fares, noting that Western Air Lines, the only U.S. carrier
offering direct service in those markets, was experiencing profitable
results in its operations. The Board had deferred action on the agreements
late last year pending receipt of additional justification from the carriers.
The Board's approval was based upon additional information pro.
vided by the carriers which set forth legitimate cost increases and overall
rate of return forecasts for 1975. The Board stated that the information,
as adjusted to comport with other data periodically reported, indicated
that in none of the ratemaking areas (other than the U.S. west coastMexico markets) will the U.S. carriers experience a return on investment
of more than twelve percent on a composite basis. In addition, the Board
concluded that further increases would not be warranted in the Mexico
and Central/South America markets for the remainder of the year.
CarrierDiscussionsAuthorized
In response to a joint application of eleven domestic airlines, the
Civil Aeronautics Board has authorized discussions among U.S. and foreign airlines that may lead to a possible re-examination of the traditional
methods of doing business between airlines and their fuel suppliers.
The carriers requesting the Board's authorization to hold discussions
expressed great concern over the long-term impact of fuel prices on their
cost of doing business and stated that the recent fuel shortage seemed to
have triggered fundamental and possibly permanent changes in the relationships between airlines and their fuel suppliers. The applicants also
claimed that some suppliers had sought to modify existing fuel contracts
unilaterally or to negotiate changes that heavily favor the suppliers. It was
also noted by the carriers that there were indications that in new contract
negotiations fuel suppliers were not only demanding substantially higher
prices, but also terms and conditions that appear onerous if not totally
unreasonable. The carriers also stated their belief that the fuel situation
was serious enough to explore possible methods of collective action looking toward the preservation of a reasonable balance of bargaining rights
with respect to future contracts. Contemplated by the carriers is the
possible retention of a joint staff of experts to assist in the purchasing
of fuel or a system of joint bargaining.
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In granting its approval of the carrier discussions, the Board noted
the potential threat of further disruption of fuel supplies resulting from
increased instability in the fuel-producing areas of the world. In this
connection, the Board observed that the recent controversy among the
major petroleum exporting countries regarding price and supply policies
was being compounded by the pricing policies of major fuel suppliers.
The Board also recognized the fact that precipitous price increases, as well
as a shortfall in fuel supplies, had presented serious problems not only to
the carriers but also to the traveling public both through fuel-related fare
increases as noted above and through reductions in frequencies.
Concluding that the carriers should have an opportunity to conduct
discussions concerning the fuel problems mentioned above, the Board
stated that it was not yet prepared to reach any determination as to
whether any agreements arising from the discussions would be consistent
with the public interest.
STRATOSPHERIC POLLUTION BY SST AIRCRAFT
The United States Department of Transportation (DOT) has completed a three-year study concerning the effects of stratospheric pollution
by aircraft upon the earth's atmosphere. The study was conducted by
DOT's Climatic Impact Assessment Program (CLAP). In conducting the
investigation, CIAP drew upon the resources of many federal departments
and agencies with numerous investigators from many universities and
other organizations in the U.S. and abroad assisting the effort.
The study resulted in the formulation of two major conclusions:
(1) operations of present-day supersonic transport aircraft, together with
those currently scheduled to enter service (approximately sixteen AngloFrench Concordes and fourteen Soviet TU-144's), will cause climatic
effects far less than those minimally detectable; and (2) any future harmful effects can be avoided if proper measures are taken to develop new
engine technology leading to lower levels of nitrogen oxide emissions and
the use of fuels having a lower sulphur content.
The report defined the minimal detectable change as the smallest
changes, due to all causes, in annual average total ozone that could be
discerned from ten years of daily global monitoring by satellites, aircraft,
balloons, and ground stations. The minimally detectable change in global
mean ozone is estimated to be 0.5%. In this connection, the report noted
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that it would require some 125 Concordes flying four and one-half hours
or more daily to reach the minimally detectable level change in the quantity of ozone in the earth's atmosphere.
The study indicated that the concentration of nitrogen oxide in the
atmosphere affects the quantity of ultraviolet rays reaching the earth's
surface. Likewise, it was noted that heavy concentrations of sulphur dioxide could increase the aerosol layer of the stratosphere thereby affecting
the quantity of visible radiation reaching the earth. While a decrease in
ultraviolet radiation could result in a salutary effect upon the environment
(decrease in incidence of skin cancer), a decrease in the quantity of
visible radiation could lower the earth's surface temperature resulting in
harmful effects upon agriculture and forestry. In this connection, it was
concluded that such concentrations could be controlled by limiting their
injection into the atmosphere by the use of improved technology, by
restricting the numbers and frequency of high-altitude aircraft, or by a
combination of both methods.
The report also concluded that a continuous atmospheric monitoring
and research program should be initiated to determine whether the atmospheric quality of the earth is being maintained. In response to this
recommendation, the Federal Aviation Administration has announced that
it will conduct a continuing program to determine the effects on the
earth's environment of high-altitude aircraft as a part of its total environmental program. It is believed that such a study could further reduce
uncertainties in current scientific knowledge, ascertain whether atmospheric quality is being maintained, provide guidance for decisions concerning regulatory actions, and minimize the cost of providing any
required environmental safeguards.
The FAA has indicated that it believes that any regulatory action to
prohibit stratospheric pollution would be ineffective unless accomplished
by all nations operating high-altitude aircraft. In this regard, the agency
intends that the program now being undertaken will facilitate the development of a program leading to international policy.
AIR TRAVEL CLUBS
Since the Civil Aeronautics Board continues to receive a large number
of inquiries concerning the operations of air travel clubs and the regulatory policies of the federal government as applied to such entities, the
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Board has made available information regarding air travel clubs that may
be helpful to the public. The specifics of the Board's statement is set forth
below:
The Federal Aviation Act requires a license from the Board before
one may engage lawfully in "common carriage" by air. Essentially, common carriage means a holding out of transportation services to the
general public in return for the payment of compensation. Since none
of the air travel clubs (there are approximately 30 such clubs) has such
a license, the legality of a given club's operations depends upon whether
that club is engaging in common carriage. This, in turn, depends upon
all of the details of the club's method of operating.
There have been three proceedings before the Board involving the
legality of air travel club operations, two of which have -been finally
decided by the Board. The first was a proceeding against Voyager 1000.
After full evidentiary hearings, the Board determined that Voyager was
engaged in common carriage and hence was operating in violation of the
Act. In reaching that conclusion, the Board began with the stipulated fact
that Voyager's services were advertised extensively to the public. The
Board observed that a person responding to the public solicitation had to
become a Voyager member before he could take a flight, and that this
required a financial outlay in the form of an initiation fee and dues, over
and above the fare charged by Voyager for a particular trip. The Board's
view, however, was that acceptance of those labels would ignore reality
because: (1) membership and the immediate right to take any trip of
one's choice was offered to the public at large; (2) admission to membership was automatic upon payment of the fees (there being no screening
of applicants for membership); and (3) fees were relatively insignificant,
particularly when compared to the fare bargains they made possible.
Voyager appealed the Board's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. in November 1973, the Court sustained
the Board's order, finding the Board's determination that the club was
engaged in common carriage to be supported by "substantial evidence and
a reasonable basis in law." Voyager 1000 v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
489 F.2d 792 (CA. 7, 1973). The Supreme Court, on May 13, 1974,
denied Voyager's petition for certiorari.
The second Board proceeding was against Aeronauts International
Travel Club. After a full evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge
determined that the club was engaged in common carriage and hence was
operating in violation of the Act. In that case, the club did not seek Board
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review of the administrative law judge's decision, and the Board's order
running against it automatically went into effect. However, three individual
officers of the club requested Board review. The case is now pending
before the Board.
The third case was against Club International, Inc., now known as
Air Club International. Again, after full evidentiary hearings, the Board
concluded that Club International was engaged in common carriage in
violation of the Act. Essentially, the Board found that the club's operations
were patterned on those involved in the Voyager case and were indistinguishable from Voyager's in any material respect. Thus, Club International
indiscriminately solicited every member of the public (for a small fee and
with no screening) to take advantge of its transportation service at savings
far exceeding the membership charge. The Board rejected the club's
principal defense which was, in effect, that the Board was precluded from
taking action against Club International, or air travel clubs in general,
because it had not taken earlier action against Club International but
rather had allowed those clubs holding safety authority under Part 123
of the Federal Aviation Regulations to institute and continue their activities with knowledge of those activities. As the Board stated, and as
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) itself has recognized, it is
the Board, not the FAA, which is the responsible agency for determining
issues- such as what constitutes common carriage- arising under those
provisions of the Act which it administers. Club International has appealed
the Board's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
The Board's statement points out that the institution of the aforementioned proceedings and their disposition in no way reflects any intent
on the part of the agency to harass air travel clubs; that the law requires
a license to engage in common carriage by air; and that the Board has
the duty to enforce that law. That is all that has been or will be done.
It has sometimes been suggested that the Board should promulgate
regulations defining the permissible limit of air travel club activities, that
is, stating when a club would be considered a common carrier. Such a
suggestion was considered by the Board in its Voyager opinion and
rejected. The basic legal elements of common carriage being clear, it was
the Board's view that a case-by-case application of such standards is the
only proper way to test whether the activities involved constitute common
carriage. This undoubtedly results in uncertainties for a club, but unfortunately the question is simply not the sort which the Board believes
can be answered by application of a precise regulatory formula. The
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Board's view that it should not attempt to define the permissible limits
of the activity other than in terms of common carriage was challenged
as legal error in Voyager's appeal from the Board's order. The Court
sustained the Board.
Finally, the Board's statement notes that air travel clubs occasionally
experience difficulties when seeking to land at foreign airports. The
difficulties appear to stem from a belief on the part of foreign officials
that at least some of the clubs are operating what some foreign officials
consider to be charters and, therefore, should apply for permission to land
in the same way as supplemental air carriers certified by the Board. The
question of whether a particular air travel club is in fact a common
carrier thus has relevance to its possible rights, as a private club, to
make flights into a transit foreign territory in accordance with Art. 5
of the Chicago Convention. Art. 5 provides, in pertinent part, that each
contracting state will permit all aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services to make flights into or in transit nonstop across its
territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity
of obtaining prior permission. When a problem of this sort arises, the
Board's position is limited to that of providing assistance to the Department of State which is responsible for dealing directly with the foreign
government involved and,.in so assisting, unless a final determination has
been made as to the nature of a particular club's operations, the Board
has cautioned against making any definite representations to the foreign
government concerning a club's status.
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT OF 1974
On January 3, 1975 the Transportation Safety Act of 1974 was
signed into law (PL 93-633). Among other things, the enactment established the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as a totally independent agency of the United States as of April 1, 1975. The Board is to
consist of five members appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. No more than three members of the
Board are to be of the same political party, and two such members are to
be appointed upon the basis of technical qualifications and professional
standing in the field of accident reconstruction, safety engineering, or
transportation safety.
The legislative history of the measure indicates that the Congress was
concerned about the NTSB's relationship to the Department of Transporta.
tion (DOT). The Senate amendment recommending the NTSB's independ-
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ence observed that, although the NTSB was established in 1966 (49 U.S.C.
1654) as an independent governmental agency, its position as a subordinate agency within DOT inhibited its ability to effectively perform the
functions for which it was designed. Since the Board's investigations
concern other government agencies and since some of its determinations
could contain severe criticism of such agencies, the Senate amendment
expressed the view that the agency would best serve the nation and fulfill
its role if it were a totally separate and independent agency. The conference committee reporting on the legislation adopted the provisions of the
Senate amendment.
The new legislation also amended the Hazardous Materials Transportation Control Act of 1970 so as to improve the regulatory and enforcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation to protect the nation
adequately against the risks to life and property which are inherent in the
transportation of hazardous materials. The measure provides, among other
things, that the Secretary shall issue regulations regarding the transportation of radioactive materials on any passenger-carrying aircraft. Such
regulations are to prohibit any such transportation unless the radioactive
materials involved are intended for use in, or incident to, research, or
medical diagnosis or treatment and are packaged in such a manner that
they do not pose an unreasonable hazard to health and safety. It should
be noted that the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
has been delegated the authority vested in the Secretary by P.L. 93-633
with respect to the transportation of radioactive materials on passengercarrying aircraft and will be expected to establish procedures for monitoring and enforcing applicable regulations.
RECENT U.S. CASE LAW
Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, C.A.D.C.
Nos. 73-1828, 1874 (1975)
This proceeding before the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit involved a petition for review of an order
of the Civil Aeronautics Board granting interim approval of a capacity
reduction agreement between three trunk airlines. The agreement provided
for mutual reductions in the number of flights operated by those air
carriers in certain long-haul markets.
The petitioner made several arguments in opposition to the Board's
interim approval. It was contended by ALPA that the Board should not
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have granted interim approval of the capacity reduction agreement without
holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the antitrust implications of the agreement were outweighed by public interest considerations; that the Board should have imposed labor protective arrangements
as a condition for interim approval of the agreement; and that the cost
savings to the carriers that were to flow from the decrease in capacity
were not in the public interest because they increased the agreement
carriers' profits.
The Court rejected ALPA's arguments and affirmed the Board's
order. The Court, reiterating its finding in a similar case, stated that
there was no statutory requirement that the Board hold a hearing in such
a case, and that the Board should have a degree of latitude in determining
whether a full evidentiary hearing would be necessary in a given case.
The Court noted, that there was however, a hearing requirement in cases
involving a substantial and material issue of fact or where the absence
of a hearing would deprive the Board of sufficient information upon
which to render a rational decision. The Court concluded that the Board's
action was justified in light of the substantial fuel and cost savings; that
the Board did not abuse its discretion; and that interim approval was
sufficiently supported by the evidence.
With respect to the issue of labor protective conditions, the Court
found no fault with the Board's determination that no labor protective
conditions should be imposed. In so holding, the Court noted the Board's
prior policy of limiting the application of labor protective conditions to
agreements involving substantial employee dislocations (e.g., mergers),
and pointed out that the Board had given adequate consideration to the
need for the imposition of labor protective conditions. The Court clearly
indicated that its disposition was not intended to limit in any way the
Board's discretion to reconsider and reverse its earlier position and impose
labor conditions'as a prerequisite to continued approval. The Court expressed its approval of the Board's practice of retaining jurisdiction over
such agreements, and indicated that the Board should not hesitate to
reconsider such decisions in cases where there may have been a substantial change in circumstances.
Air Europe Internationa4 SA. v. Robert D. Timm, 13 Avi. 17,434 (1974)
This proceeding was before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia on a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff was a Luxembourg
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corporation that was promoting the operation of a Luxembourg-Tijuana,
Mexico, air passenger service, and the defendants were the five members
of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The plaintiff had alleged that employees of
the defendants Jad made statements to the press which were intended to
and did in fact create the false impression that the plaintiff's air transportation service was illegal, that the Board had officially decided that the
plaintiff's operations was in violation of some provision of United States
law, and that the Board had officially decided to terminate the plaintiff's
air transportation service. The plaintiff had also alleged that the complained of statements to the press were false, that plaintiff's proposed
operations were not illegal, and that the "leaked" statements had damaged
the plaintiff to the extent that it was necessary to discontinue its sales
efforts and postpone the inauguration of its service. However, the plaintiff
did not allege that the defendants or any of them made any of the statements which were complained of or that such statements were official
Board action.
While expressing sympathy for the plaintiff's claim, the Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, and for lack of a case or controversy pursuant to Article III
of the United States Constitution.
The Court noted that Air Europe's proposed operation consisted
primarily of transporting U.S. residents to Europe and return, and was
apparently designed to circumvent the economic regulatory authority of
the Board pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301
et seq.). The plaintiff had complied with the safety requirements of the
Federal Aviation Administration, and there was no showing that it was in
violation of any U.S. law or regulation. The evidence indicated that the
plaintiff bad been successful in avoiding the economic jurisdiction of the
Board. Nevertheless, it was the plaintiff's position that the Board, through
"leaks" to newpapers and the trade press, had done indirectly what it
could not do officially,. that is, prevent the inauguration of Air Europe's
service. The Court agreed that the statements complained of may have
contributed to the plaintiff's inability to inaugurate service, since, taken
as a whole, the statements in the press indicated that official proscription
of the plaintiff's proposed operations was imminent and that the Luxembourg-Tijuana operation, if not illegal, was unethical and would be stopped
by whatever means necessary.
While indicating its displeasure with the tactics pursued by the staff
members of the Board, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. In so

holing, the court pointed out that the plaintiff had sought not only to
preclude interference with its operation by statements from Board sources
of the type described, but had also sought to obtain a judicial declaration
that the Board had no jurisdiction over Air Europe's proposed operation.
This the Court could not do. Concluding that such relief had no basis in
the'plaintiff's allegations, the court pointed out that in order to overcome
a motion to dismiss, there must be an allegation of agency action adverse
to the plaintiff (see Sec. 10(a) and (c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. 702 and 704). In this regard, the court noted that there had
been no such action- by the Board with respect to the question of its
jurisdiction over Air Europe's. proposed operation.
Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 13 Avi. i7,482 (1974)
This proceeding arose from the refusal 'of an air carrier to transport
a passenger who was the holder of a valid and confirmed ticket for air
transportation between London and Detroit. The U.S. District Court,
Southern District of New York, held that the defendant air carrier was
well within its right in refusing transportation to the plaintiff pursuant
to Sec. 1111 of the Federal Aviation Act, and that the defendant's refusal
was not, under the circumstances presented, arbitrary or unreasonable,
nor did it subject the plaintiff to any unjust discrimination or any undue
or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever as
proscribed by Sec. 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act.
The plaintiff had fled the United States in the early 1960's to avoid
prosecution on a kidnapping charge and had traveled abroad for a number
of years including trips to Cuba, Communist China, and Tanzania. Upon
deciding to return to the United States, the plaintiff purchased a ticket
for air passage from Tanzania to London, England, and thereafter from
London by direct flight to Detroit, Michigan on the defendant air carrier.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation notified the defendant that the plaintiff was a fugitive, that he was planning to arrive at Detroit aboard the
defendant's aircraft, and that there was a possibility of a public demonstration. The FBI requested the defendant to park the aircraft in question
somewhere other than at the passenger terminal, or to reroute the aircraft
to a different terminal. Upon receiving such information, the defendant
air carrier notified its London officials that they should deny the plaintiff
passage which directive was followed. That decision was made by the
defendant air carrier's president based upon the following information:
(.1) an FBI Wanted Bulletin including information that the plaintiff was
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a fugitive from an indictment and should be considered armed and
dangerous; the possibility of a demonstration upon the plaintiffs arrival
at Detroit; and the danger of a possible hijacking attempt. After a brief
period in the custody of British officials, the plaintiff was flown by the
defendant to Detroit on a special unscheduled non-stop flight. Upon
arrival at the Detroit terminal, the plaintiff was taken into custody by
the FBI.
The court recognized that during the past fifteen years the problem
of hijacking of commercial aircraft had been one of the greatest hazards
to air transportation, and that such piratical practices had resulted in the
loss of many lives not to mention the disruption of plans, the inconvenience, and the financial losses suffered by hundreds of people. It was noted
that in an attempt to deal with such problems, the Congress enacted
legislation authorizing air carriers to refuse transportation to any passenger
when in the air carrier's opinion such transportation would or might be
inimical to the safety of flight. The plaintiff, however, had contended that
the authority of the air carriers in that regard were strictly limited by
Sec. 404(b) as noted above. It was argued, among other things, that the
defendant had no right to rely upon the written and oral representations
of the FBI and that in order for the defendant carrier to refuse transportation it was required to investigate in depth the FBI's statements and
to inquire into the plaintiff's personal history as well. In rejecting this
argument, the Court stated that Congress did not intend that such an
inquiry be made. Rather, the test of whether the air carrier properly
exercised its power rests upon the facts of the case as known to the carrier
at the time it-formed its opinion and whether its opinion and decision were
rational and reasonable and not capricious or arbitrary. The court concluded that the carrier, in deciding to refuse passage to the plaintiff, was
entitled to accept at face value the oral and written representations made
by the FBI regarding the plaintiff, and that the fact that the plaintiff was
not actually armed and appeared amenable when he presented himself
to board the defendant air carrier's aircraft in London did not call for
a change of opinion.
Judgment affirmed.
Miller v. United States, 13 Avi. 17,443 (1974)
This proceeding arose from deaths that resulted from the crash of a
commercial airliner on its landing approach at the Greater Cincinnati
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Airport. Five of the seven crew members and sixty-five of the seventy-five
passengers sustained fatal injuries in the accident. The passengers and
their estates filed numerous suits against the air carrier, and the aircraft
and instrument manufacturers, while the crew filed suit against the United
States for negligence on the part of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in controlling the landing of the ill-fated aircraft. The litigation
was consolidated in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky,
pursuant to the Multidistrict Litigation Act (28 U.S.C. 1407). The trial
court granted summary judgment against the air carrier, but dismissed
the claims against the respective manufacturers and the United States.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial, concluding that
summary judgment was precluded by the existence of factual issues. This
proceeding concerns the suit by the crew against the United States.
Liability on the part of the United States was predicated on the
Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. 1346(b)) which provides, in pertinent
part, that "The district courts. ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for

injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred."
The plaintiff's alleged that the defendant FAA was negligent in
several respects: (1) failure to ascertain and transmit to the airline crew
the correct meteorological data; (2) failure to direct the aircraft to a
runway with milder weather conditions and superior navigational aids;
and (3) failure to activate the "glide slope" (despite a .05 degree error
that had been discovered several days before the accident).
The Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim against the FAA was
not judicially cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In this
connection, the Court pointed out that the Act does not apply to ". .. any

claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern.
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused" (28 U.S.C.
2680(a)). Noting that this section was intended to insulate the rulemaking
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functions of the administrative branches of the Government, the Court
stated that the establishment of requirements for aircraft and pilots and
the provision of landing systems, communications, and weather information facilities were discretionary functions of government.
After a survey of the evidence, it was also determined that the
record disclosed no actionable negligence on the part of individual FAA
officials. The court found that while the weather on the day in question
was undoubtedly poor, there was no evidence that the visibility was
improperly ascertained. Rather it was apparent that the weather observations were consistent with accepted standards governing such determinations. In this regard, the cockpit voice recorder revealed that the aircraft
crew was properly informed of prevailing meteorological conditions. Nor
did the court find fault with the FAA's failure to assign the aircraft to a
different runway, stating that while a complete instrument landing system
(ILS) was not in operation on the assigned runway, sufficient navigational aids were present for a "nonprecision instrument approach."
Important, in this connection, was the fact that the pilot as the final
authority over runway choice at no time requested diversion to another
approach even after being informed of the prevailing conditions on the
assigned runway. The Court also rejected the contention that the glide
slope should have been activated, noting that FAA regulation's prohibit
the operation of such a device if it is producing erroneous data of the
magnitude on record.
The Court, therefore, concluded that the accident was attributable to
the crew's failure to detect the aircraft's excessively low altitude, and that
such conclusion necessarily severed any causation flowing from the conduct
of FAA officials. It was not disputed that the aircraft, with no malfunction
of aircraft or equipment, was allowed at a distance of two miles from the
runway to descend 225 feet below the elevation of the point upon which
it proposed to land. In the Courts view, that fact was the sole proximate
cause of the accident. Accordingly, there was no justification for the
imposition of liability upon the United States.

